Sensible debt buybacks for highly indebted countries by Detragiache, Enrica
Policy,  Re"arch, and External  Affairs
WORKING PAPERS
Debt  and  International  Finance
International  Economics  Department
The  World  Bank
March  1991
WPS 621
Sensible  Debt Buybacks
for Highly  Indebted
Countries
Enrica  Detragiache
Concerted agreements in which debt repurchases are linked to
reduced interest rates or new-money requirements can make
buybacks at a fair price viable, while preventing a free-rider
problem among lenders.
'IThe  POlicy  Research. dnd  FIcmal  Affair  ('omplex  disinhuICt- PRE Working  Papcrn  i.idv,ct:naic  die findings  of v.  ,rk  in progrca  and
in ct-.isragc  iŽw ",hinge  o'  dca, among liank  1.fl  and a::  ,thcr,  ;nscrescd  in dc%c:oprmcnt  :-suc  ['hsc  parcl,  canT  the names of
:he a.::!:rs.  neficold illnk  1tc:m  N c,%, and  hou:d he uMed  and  tad a.u.dingi  s  I nc fincinp i  nterpiciationm. and conclusions  are the
















































































































dPolicy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs
Debt  and International  Finance
WPS 621
This  paper  - a product of  the Debt and  International Finance Division.  International F;cononmics
Department  - is part oi a largereffort in PRE to understand the  benclits andl  costs ol voluntarN  markct-
based debt and debt service reduction operations.  Copies are available tree tiom the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.  Please contact Sheilah King-Watson, room Sg-040, extension
33730 (32 pages).
Previous studies indicate that debt buybacks at  at the fair price are desirable if the country
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because the lack of a seniority structure in  if large rescrve holdings tend to increase trans-
sovereign lcnding  distorts secondary market  fers to creditors in default states.
prices upward.
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Detragiache examines whether welfare-  chases are linked to cuts in interest rates or new
improving buybacks would arise at the "fair"  money requirements can makc buybacks at the
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In recent vears. as weii as  in  previous international debt crises. highlv indebted
countries (Hi!s'  have  devoted considerable resources tc.  repurchasing some of  their
outstanding deDt at a discount on the secondarv market.  Recent buybacks have Deen  oi
various nature, sometimes  financed by donors' funds, sometimes  through the country's own
reserves.  In some instances thev have been part of larger agreements  with creditors. while
other times  they have  been carried  out  on  the  country's  own initiative  and  through
intermeciaries.  In some cases thev have been carried out as debt for equity swaps. or as
swaps for exit bonds.  In any case, economists  and policy advisors have been debating on
the rationale for such buvbacks and about their desirabilitv.  One of the central auestions
is whether it is appropriate for international institutions or potential donors tc  commit
considerable  amounts of funds to promote debt repurchases.  as they are currentlv doing, or
whether HICs would  profit more from aid earmarked for investment or consumption.
A iot of the  earlv debate focused on  the  beneficial effects of debt  reduction on
investment in the indebted countryl.  The presence of a large debt overhang, acting as a
distortionarv tax.  reduces the expected marginal return  from investing in  the  indebted
country.  A buvback, by reducing the volume of debt outstanding reduces the distortion,
and makes the world Dattern of production more efficient (see  for instance Froot (1989)J.
BuGow  and Rogoff  '1989,, however,  c.r.tcized the very foundations  of this argument.  First
of all.  thev correctlv pointed out  that  buvbacks should be regarded as  a  use of funds
alternative to investment, and that the larger the overhang  the less beneficial  are buybacks
'For a survev. see S.Claessens  and I. Diwan (1988).comDared to  investment.  Eulow  and  Rogoff also  argued  that  aebt  buvbacks  at  market
prices make  creditors  better  off, because  debt  is repurchased  at  its  average  price  rather
than  at  the (lower'  marginal  price,  and  that  this  anomaiv  has such  a  strong  effect  that
cour.tries are likely to  be better  off if they do not buyback any debt at all, unless additional
concessions are obtained  from the creditors.  This result also implies that donors who want
to  help a  highly  indebted  country  would do better  giving  aid to  finance  consumption  or
investment.  rather than to finance debt buvbacis at the market  price.
Debt  buybacks  are  an  investment  in  a  pat.i:cular  type  of  asset,  and  their
attractiveness can be evaiuated in terms of their rate  of return  and of their covariance  with
the  country'.  consumption,  as  models  of  intertemporal  asset  pricing  indicate.  The
divergence between the  marginal and  average price of debt.  stressed bv Bulow and  Rogoff.
arises because each creditor expects to share in default proceeds in proportion  to his claims,
no  matter  how  much  debt  the  countrv  had  contracted  at  the  time  of  the  loan.  If  a
seniority  structure  could be established  in  international  sovereign lending,  the  divergence
would  disappear.  and  debt  buvbacks  would  occur at  a  "fair  price'.  that  is  a  price  that
yields  an expected  rate  of return  equal  to  the  risk-free  interest  rate.  Since lenders  are
modeled as risk-neutrai.  in a competitive  eauilibrium  thev should purchase  assets at  that
rate.  Hence, the fact that  countries  are forced to repurchase debt at  the average  price is a
distortion.  and in equilibrium rational  and optimizing countries  retire too little  debt.  This
same distortion  generates  a bias in favor of too much borrowing.
This Daper is concerned with  trving  to  determine  if and  under  wh -t  circumstances
debt  buybacks  at  the fair price can be welfare-improving.  H such buybacks exist, there  is
a scope for trving  to remove the distortion.  and  possible policies to achieve that  result  need
to be discussed.The  anaivsis  of  debt  buvbacis  is  carried  out  in  a  model  of  intertemporai
optimization,  in  which  a  risk-.averse  planner  maximizes  future  expected  utilit.
Introducing  risk-aversion  also  aliows  to  discuss  issues  of  intertemDorai  consumDtion
smooth..g, which  are neglected i-.  m.odels with  :snear  -i  :v  &&z  ebbza;s  a..
treated  as an asset.  and  if for some parameter  vaiues tne asset is in positive demand  when
it is sold at the fair price welfare-improving  buybacks exist.
When interested in smoothing consumption. a countrv mav want to buvback debt  ii
it  experiences  a  particularly  favorable  state  of nature,  such  as exceptionally  high  expor.
revenues. so  as  to  transfer some  of  the  revenues  into  the  future.  Investing  in  debt
repurchases,  however, yields a  positive rate  of return  only in states  of the  wcGrd  in which
debt  is expected  to  be  serviced.  since oniv  in  those  states  a  reduced  face  value  of debt
induces srmaler transfers  to creditorr.  But  future  repayment  states  tend to be high income
states.  ania  intra-temDorai  consumption  smoothing  would  require  transferring  more
consumption  to  the  low-income  states.  If  the  country has  access to  an  alternative  asset
that Davs a rate of return  comparable to buvbacks. and that  ailows to  transfer consumption
to  default  states,  such  asset  would  domrinate debt  repurchases.  In  particular,  foreign
exchange reserves alwavs dominate  buvbacks.  even if the latter  take  piace at the fair price.
if reserves do not  increase  the  transfer  to  creditors  in default  states.  In  principle, official
reserv  s  cannot  be  attached  bv  creditors.  but  empirical  evidence  on  secondarv  market
prices suggests that  the stock of reserves has a significant and  positive impact  on expected
repavment.  When  this  is  the  case.  debt  buvbacks  at  the  fair  price  can  be  welfare
improving.
Investment  in Dhvsical capital  is also anailvzed. Here the results  depend not  onlv on
how much of the  returns  lenders can seize in default  states,  but  also or, the  covariance of4
the r  arginal prod  t of capita.  with  consumption.  If investment  is in a ploduction  that  is
positively correlated with aggregate output, it tends to increase  the volatility of aggregate
consumption. In this case. even if the marginal product of capital is eaqual  to the expected
return onr  buybacks,  buybacks may be welfare-improving.
The second Dart of the paDer  looks at how the diistortion  due to the lack of senioritv
can  be eliminated if  buybacks are accompanied by concessions such as  a  reduction in
interest rates or new monev  reouirements. Schemes  can be devised  so th_t no lender has an
incentive to deviate frorm  the agreement. For this to be the case, concessior.s  must be large
enough to drive the secondarv  market price to what would be the post-bu  back fair price if
no concessions were made.  Since bazgaining between the parties  is not  lik. ly to remove the
distortion compietely. there seems to be a rationaie for poiicv measures that  enhance the
attractiveness of buybacks.  Recent episodes of debt reduction agreements are discussed
from this perspective.
Finially, other  potential aspects (besides the  lack of seniority) that  may distort
banks  valuation of HIC debt  are  brieflv discussed.  The Dresence  of mispriced federal
deposit insurance, and  the asymmetry of the  corporate-tax  system are  likely to  affect
secondarv market  prices of  HIC  debt.  The  conclusions summarize results and  open
quest4ions.
2.  The Model.
The highly indebted country is a sr..all oper. economy, that receives an endowment
of a traaed  gooa vt everv perioa.  vt is the realization of an independentiv and identicaliv
distributed random process Y, with support  Y,  Let prob {Y > y} =  G(y'  and G'(y)  =5
gvy). The countrv has inherited from the past a stock of debt. in the form of a sequence  of
one-period pule discount bonds with face 'alue  d.  For sirnp'Hicir,  let dt = d V t.  D is the
present discounted value of inherited debt at anv date.  The c,  ntry  ca4 aiso issue new
one-period discount bonds bt.  L  et p(bt) be :he price at which these new bonds are sold.  A
negative vaiue for bt will be interpreted as a debt buvback. For the moment no other asset
is assumed  to be available to the indebted country.  At every period the country can choose
to default on her debt. at the cost of being forced into financiai autarkv  and of losing  an
amount A(y,).  As usual, it is assumed that  the loss is increasing  with income, and that it
accrues to the creditors.  Under these assumptions. the maximum utilitv  that the countrv
can achieve .- i  defaults a+ t is
\vd(y)  =  u(yt - A6yt3)  S  E [u(Y -A(Y))
where u(  is a  concave utilitv  index. 6 is the  ra.te at  which the  countrv discounts the
Luture,  and E  is the expectations operator 2. Notice that  if default occurs, payments to
creditors become state-contingent. and with A'()  >  0 consump.  is less variable thar.
output.  So debt with default risk offers some risk-shifting opportunities for countries, but
2The model can also be interpreted as one in which in iefault states bargaining between the
countrv and her creditors takes Diace. In this case 'Mvt) is the solution to the bargaining
garne that  takes place in every period.  Ir. general. it could be the case that  at least for
some histories of the shock the  transfer A(yt) depends on the face value of accumuiated
debt. if the country can return  to solvencv with some probabiiitv.  To keeD  the  probiem
tractable. this possibilitv is reglected here.6
is far from allowing the countrv to fullv insure against output  fluctuations3.
The  price  at  which  new  bond  issues  are  purchased  by  competitive,  risk-neutral
investors  depends  on  how the  proceeds in case of default  are shared  amcng  the creditors.
This,  in turn,  depends on whether seniority  rules are enforceable.  Bulow a,nd Rogoff (1988)
argpe  that  in  sovereign  lending  ail  lenders  are  treated  Dari  assu.  hence  tne  default
proceeds are  shared  in proportion  to  claims.  This  stance  seems  to  be  supported  by the
empirical  observation  that  recent  debt  reschedulings have treated  all lenders in the  same
way.  The price at which bt units  of a new bond could be issued if seniority  existed,  which
will often be referred  to as the fair Drice for reasons that  will become clear later. is
(2)  D(bt)  =  6 i  - G(yt+1)j
where  3 =  (1  +  r)-  and  r  is the  ienders'  rpportunitv  cost  of funds.  Y.,! is the  levei of
..come at- which  in period  t'1  b-orrowers ar-.  - a:.e:en'  be:weer. repayment  and
default.  This vaiue  is in general  a function  of bt.  With  seniority.  and  assuming  that  the
outstanding  debt  is large enough not  to be fully serviced with  certainty,  junior  lenders do
not expect  to  receive anv of the default  proceeds.  On the other  hand. as shown bv Bulow
and Rogoff (1988), without seniority the country is able to issue at price
x2')  p(br) =3  {[  Y-  tI  +  Iy\)  (Dr + b >!}
3Some authors.  such as  H. Grossman  and  J. Van  Huvck  (1988). T.  Worrall  (1990). and
recently  K.  Kletzer  and  B.  Wright  (1990),  hold  the  view  that  banks  and  sovereign
borrowers  write  an  implicit  ccntract  that  (except  for  default  states)  mimicks  a  fuuiy
state-contingent  contract.  This  view seems  at  oda's with  the fact  that  countries  default
when thev are hit  bv bad shocks. rather  the:  the other wav around.where
*  I.  r  '~~F  ;Y)1 
y'+ =J .d  K  A(Y)+  r  g\y,  dy
Y  t  i -
is the exDected value of the  default  proceeds  at  t.  Y'1, 1 C Y is the set  of default  states  at
t+1.  The  difference between  the  two  prices, oi  course,  depends  on the  size of A, on the
likelihood of a default.  and on the  value of debt outstanding.  If the country  is buving back
debt,  the  presence  of junior  creditors  aliows  to  repurchase  at  a  lower  price.  Without
senioritv  rules.  bv  increasing  the  level  of  debt  the  countrv  reauces  the  vaiue  of  oid
creditors'  claims, while debt buybacks have the opposite effect.
The  lack  of  senioritv  has  a  startling  side-effect,  when  borrowing  behavior  is
examined.  Notice that  if debt is large enough that  G(yt+i)  =  1, the issue price is zero with
aeniority, m2aning that  no new borrowing is possible. as it should be.  Inspection  of (2').  on
the other  hand,  reveals that  this  price is positive  for any  bounded  amount  of debt.  But
this  means  that  the  countrv  can raise  anv  bounded  amount  of money without  increasing
future  payments,  as  long as  it  offers  a  high  enough  interest  rate.  The  new  loans  are
effectively paid  off by reducing  payments  to  existing  creditors.  In such a framework.  no
lending  wouid  arise  in  equilibrium.  Eithc-  oanks  expect  to  be  able  to  enforce  their
senioritv  rights.  or thev tacitly  collude. and refuse to extend new loans at high interest  rate
beyond a certain  threshold.  in practice,  most H'Cs  are unable to  increase their  l,ong-terrr.
borrowing even though  thev are paving low interest  rates on it.  Short-term  credit.  which
typically  carries  larger  spreads,  has  not  increased  but  rather  diminished  since  the  early'80s.  At  least  at first  inspection.  the tacit  collusion hvpothesis  seems the  most  likelv.  A
more detailed  analysis  cf this  issue is left to  future  extensions'.  For  the  purposes of this
model. it will be assumed that  ienders collec-tivelv  impose a ceiling o on the totai  amount  of
indebtedness of the country.  The exact value of b has no bearing on the analysis.
Let  et  =  - a  Pt  be the  inverse of the  ela3ticitv  of the  dem,nd  for  new bonds.
pt a bt
Then using (2')
13)  =  14yt.1) (Dt +  bt)-2 r  -b  tD  l{p(bt) - 1-  G(3)I 31
p(btl)  (bc + Dt) 
X or smaii buybacks et is close to zero, and it is aiways iess than one.
Let's  now turn  to  the decision  problem  of a  planner  within  the  indebted  countrv.
Define the  indicator  Iunction 
4 t  that  takes  the value 1 if the  country  repays and  zero ii  it
defaults.  The problem is to choose values of ct, f.  and bt that  solve
max E.  Et u(ct)
SAO Ct > 0,  DO  U,  fi  {O,  iJ,  Dt  <  b
c; =  Yt - t  rb,-X  + d -pt(bt)  bt] + (1 -)  A(vy)
ft = 0 V t  >  r  if  =G
4Accidentaiv. aiong this line it couid be exDiained w.  ioans at verv high interest  rates are
not observed in sovereign lending, while thev exist in domestic credit  markets (junl--bonds
and  credit  cards. for instance).  Without  senioritv and  with  substantial  default  proceeds to
be appropriated,  high-interest  rate  debt is a  way of "ripp:.ng off'  existing lenders, and the
financiai  communitv  would sanction  it.  This  is not  the  case when  senioritv  works  and
default  proceeds are small. as in domestic  lending.9
This  problem can be rewritten  in a recursive wav.  Let's drop the subscript t and denote  bv
a prime variables pertaining  to  he next period.  The solution to the planner's  problem is a
value function
V(b. v) = max [Vr(b. v). Vd(y)j
where Vd is as defined in (1) and Vr is the value function under repayment. defined as
V'(b. v)  max  u(c)  + 6Et  {max [V(b'  y'). Vd(  W)]}
s.to  b'  < b
where  r =  v-d  - b +  p(b')  b'.  At everv Deriod the default  level of income is implicitlv
defined by
Vr(b, y*) = V  d(y*
Let A, be the multiplier  associateu  witn  the  constraint  on the volume of borrowing.  The
first order and envelope conditions for this  problem vield
(4  )D((b',[  - =  + J(f  V:(b':  Y) g(y) dv = O
(_)  \,~~~~~rl(b,  7)  1_(cj  )  y  E  Yri1
where  e is defined in (3)  above.  The complementarv  siackness conditions  associated  with
*he cr.edit constralnt  are
'6)  ~~~~~~~~~(b  -'=O,  j
Notice that  default  is more attractive  when income is low,  'oz two reasons:  The loss M(y)  is
smaller  when v is iow. and the future  expected  vaiue of repavment  is likelv to  be smaller.
s.nce b'  s 'a.-ger Ior low v and Vr is a dec.easing  function of b
If the credit coi,straint  is not  binding. manipulating  (4) and (5) vields
(7)  u,(c  ) =  I  - I Cyul(c~)g(y)  dv
±  I p(b')  f1 - 1 j  r3
Define expected marginau utiiity  conditionai on repayment
E Luj(c,)  Y,]  f  y, uI(c,) g(y) dy  1  -(y
r  J
Hence (7) becomes
[6  ui(c,)  I  'L  G(y*f)J
I  - r  I =
!  U!(C;3  1 o(b')  [1  _  e]
If default  occurs with zero probability  and the  country  behaves like a small agent (e  =  0)
at  an  optimum  the  expected  margina;  rate  of substitution  across periods  is equal  to  therisk-free  interest  rate  (1 +  r). since when G(y*')  = 0 p(b')  =  3 = Q1 E- rV.  In this  case.
there  is perfect  consumption  smoothing  over  time, although  no  consumption  smooth.inb
across states  of nature:  With  no asset  paving a state-contingent  return  the  cou:,trv cannot
obtain  any  insurance.  When the  current  value  of y  is large, the country  wants to  reduce
the stock of debt through  buvbacks.
On the other  hand,  with a positive pzc'  :;  . c..::  as  he o..',v asset
available.  income  can  be  transferred  onlv  across  revayment  states.  The  expectea  bona
yield is equalized to  the marginal  rate  of substitution  conditional  on repayment  occurring
in the  next period.  With  seniority.  D(b') =  8 [1 - G(y*')]. and  the bonds are expected to
yield  the  risk-free  interest  rate,  as  it  shou'ld  be  since  lenders  are  competitive  an-
risk-neutral.  In  this  sense. tne  Drice of debt  with senioritv  is fair.  while under  the  Darl
Dassu ru 1z new borrowing is too cheap and debt buybacks too expensive.  At the fair price,
E luK(cP I 1r  = ul(cl3
Buybacks  are  welfare  improving  if  the  current  income  is  so favorable  that  it  exceeds
expected  future  income  in  repavment  states.  If the  probabilitv  of default  is  large.  Y'
contains only the upper tail  of the  distribution  of Y, and the probability  that  a state  of the
world in which buvbacks are needed is smali.  Hence. it is less likelv that  countries  whose
debt is sold at very large discounts  could benefit from a repurchase. Note, however, that  Y'r
is the set of repavment  states after the buvback.
A second  distortion  comes from  the  fact  that  the  courtry  is  'ikeelv t^  behave as a
large agent.  an take  into account the effects of increased voiumes on the Drice.  With  e  # 0.
both buybacks and  new borrowing take place in smaller quantities.12
Finall,v. if the credit constraint  is binding no new borrowing is possible even if there
.s a..  unfavorable realization,  aind the  extent  of intertemporal  consumption  smoothing that
can be achieved is very smali.
3. Reserve Accumulation.
The set-up  proposed in the preceding section. although  it highlights  the role of bank
debt in intertemporal  consumption  smoothing, is too restrictive  to realistically  describe the
menu of assets available to  a highlv indebted  economv.  Countries can accumulate  reserves
or  physical  capital  as  an  alternative  to  debt  buybacks  when  they  wan-  ;c  ;rarsfer
consumption  to the  future.  Moreover. asset  accumuiation  allows to  transfer  consumption
also to default states,  which is impossible if only debt buybacks are permitted.  This option
is verv vaiuable if states  of the world in which default  occurs tend  to  be low-consumDtion
states.  On the other hand, if more reserves or more physical capital  increase the transfer to
creditors  in  default  states  (because  for instance  they  can be partiallv  seized). there  is an
incentive not to accumulate therr.
Let's  assume that  the  debtor  countrv  can accumulate  foreign exchange  reserves st
that  yield a (gross)  rate of return  equal to  p).  Suppose for the moment  that  the transfer to
creditors  if default  occurs does not  depend on the level of reserves.  Under these assumption
the utility from defaulting at t  is defined recursively as
V'a(s, y'  =  max u(cd)+  FE \  ds,  y')j
5
S.to  s > 13
where  cd = y - A"y)  +  s  - s'.  At an interior  optimum  the following  condition  holds
V  (s, y) =  ulu(cd)
The default level of output y*'can be obtained as in section 2.  Since reserves  do not affect
proceeds  in Case  of default.  the expressio  ns for p(b)  derived in section 2 still hold.  To keep
things simple, throughout this sectior.  it  will  be assumed th,at khe  country takes the price of
bonds as parametric, so c = 0.  Tne value function in repayment states is now
Vr(s. b. v) = max  u(c)  + SE max [Vr(s. b'y  vd')V( y')J
s .b
s.to  b' < b.  s' > 0
where cr =  - (d  ±  b) +  D(b') b' +  -Y  s - s'.  Let i1 be the multiplier associated to the
constraint on reserves.  if  the credit ceiling is not binding, the first order and envelope
conditions vield
(9)  u (c  )  gy)  d_v  if
L  d  J
(13)  ui(c:) =  g  fy  u1(c,Jg(y) dv
while the complementary slackress conditions  are14
qs  =0,  Ž  > O
The first equation  is the derivative  of the objective function with respect to  reserves.  Since
reserves increase future  utilitv  in both  reDavment and default states.  the marginal  utilitv of
cu.rent  consumption  must  be  equal  .o  expected  fcuture marginal  utility  over  al  possible
states.  Combining (9) and (10) and rearranging
(11)  E [ul(c)  1  - E iu(C'  yj  [I.  - G(c*')]  |'  - Y(b'~  7'
G  Gy*I)J  I p(b') 
The meaning  of this  equation  becomes clear  once we notice  that  if p(b')  is the fair price
and if reserves pav the risk-free rate (>y  =  )  (11) becomes
E  Iu(cr)  YI] =Eu  I(cA)  IY,
At  an  optimum.  the  marginal  rate  of substitution  betwcen  default  and  repavment  states
must  be  equal  to  one:  With  two  assets,  one that  pays  a  negative  return  in  repayment
states  and  nothirg  in default  states.  while the other  pavs a fixed return  in everv state.  the
country  can  obtain  some insurance.  If  there  is seniority  and  -Y  =  ,  the  insurance  is
offered at fair terms. and expected marginal utilities are equalized across states.
Since default states  tend to be low-income states,  expected margina;  utilities  can be
eaualized  onlv  through  accumulating  new  debt.  which  is  the  onlv  way  to  lower
consumption  in repayment  states  without  reducing  consumption  in default  states  as well.this  til  st'  wy  el.,t t,lvit,a ks fies¢tr  ui(  I  u:  t  1  ife  (lii?  rv  Ix(ei iev  es  I  . laI,  Ite  StiN k  at  I
Ii  .''a  ^  t  I  <  ;I  r;-ae!  <A  St'  ,iq  igzls  a  n.  r!  l,  i:  !-  itrr  l..  i-;.
consipit)t  imi i  it hoth states  aild (dfe;t ftdtl  ts  (ousniot  I(ll  Itl r'uDVnieIot  stale  aII  ti  t.-
oi  reserves  I rea uc ig  tut.ure  cm)isurnolot  1.  n)ut  at  tile  samile til  ie  dIn  eae  debt  I(o Stilloolli
,nsurnp,  i-n  a(  rss  sts  t  ir  nhe  hext  )t:  suni  Up.  if the (  I.t;.  r  '  s ,,sk-a ers-. i
default states  are low-income states.  and ii reserves can be ad(umuiated at  the risk-tlee
rate  without  increasing  tihe transfv:  cred  Ors  irn  case  of defau'l.  uy l,acks  are  aizwas
'  en  it  r  nv  tlake ota,,e  at  the  iair orice.
-hese results  are  rather  paradv,xiCal:  T.t...ar'  srr;|j(,th  corns.mptior  over  ti...e  a
countrv  perpetuailv  increases  her  stock  of  debt.  Since  the  ievei  of  reserves  fluctuates
depending, or  thlt  statt  of  nature.  the  net  s  ,c'A  f foreign  assets  :. ;le  our!  :v  ,UCtUa:e  s  a0s
well.  This  strange  ouitcome  stems  trom  Itle itereral  lack  of financiai  inistrumiients to  insure
against  future  aggregate  sh.-cks.  '  there  was  an  asset-  paying  a  return  in  default  states
alone.  debt  would  be run  down  when  current  income  is iaree.
The  assumption  thiat  countries  can  hold  reserves  without  increasint;  defa.l
avnments  at  ali  seems  extrenie.  Emoiricai  evidence  stwgests  that  reserves  do  affect
-xpec-ed  repayment:  Both  Acharva  and  D.w an  (1989)  and  Ozler  and  Huizinga  (19'E0) firnd
a  positive  and  significant  coefficient  for  the  reserve-to-GNT'  ratio  in regressions  exDlaining
the  secondary  market,  prict  Mf debt.  This  .. s  ,puzzling,  since  ir  princip>  :,fticiu  resers
cannot  he  attached  bv  cre(iitors  accordiinc  to  international  law  osee  1).  Folkerts-Lanciau
5As  5.  O'Connel.  (  )& puts  it.  the  co,untrv  borrows  to  finance  tr;e  accurnuiation  of
reserves.'  I  it  111  (ra(  tice.  there  marv  be d(oubts as  to  whether this aspect ot sovere  ign  immunity
Will b  cI,  . r,-:I  -it,  t ast,  )f a;i  utrigl-t  lepudiation:  (a_  .,1 Irani's  assts  in th-  'S.  were
trozeri  in  1'O').  for  Instance)  Such  ruies  alwavs  devend  on  the  willineness  of  the  iending
..v.;,zrv'j  guvy  nu  .tcoCoperate,  which  is  guided  by  political  considerations  that  are
hard  to foresee
Arinthv-.  perhams  niore  appealing,  argument  +t'  explain  why  reserves  increase
pavments  to creditors  has to do with the interpretation  of the defauit  transfer7.  In section 2
it  was suggested  that  A(  reflects  the  ability  of creditors  to  punish  a  default.  But  this
need not alwavs he the case:  To service foreign debt.  HIC governments  not onlv have to  be
W...i!g  ';_  do si.,  Lut  the)  must  b￿  abe  to generate  a  sufficient!y large  budget  surplus  .
finance  the  pavyrients.  This  internal  transfer  mav  often  be  probiematic  in  countries  in
which the tax-base  is eroded by tax-evasion,  capital  flight, and  political constraints.  The
government  can trv  to increase domestic borrowing. or use the inflation tax. but  both these
remedies can on!y raise  d  limited  amount  of funds.  If this  domestic-finance  constraint  is
tighter  than  tne no-default  constraint  for some values of v. there  is a  region in which the
transfer to creditor  depends on the size of the government's  budget surplus.  In this  region,
foreign  exchange  reserves  (which  are  owned  bv  the  Central  Bank.  a  part  of  the
government)  increase the transfer  to creditors  one-for-one.
A third  reason whv HICs mav  be reluctant  to  keep a iarge volume of reserves  is if
they expect  {oreign aid 'or  concessional Iending) to  come to  their rescue when thev are hit
bv a bad shock.  Countries that  have large foreign exchange reserve holdings are not  likelv
3This empiricai  evidence also contradicts  3'Connelis  bargaining  model. in which reserves
increase  the  debtor's  bargaining  power  in  default  states.  and  hence  should  reduce  the
transfer.
71 thank  Eduardo Fernande2--Arias for suggesting me this  line of reasoning.I(
to  receive  much aid.  so the  valtue  (it the exipected  suhsidv  froin  this  irinipi(it  ilsulratne
shernt,  falls with the size  f  reserves.  This  hypothesis  (arl  li  enipiri,a  I  ,  t  '
checking whether  the  inflow of (oncessional lending and foreign aid is negativeiv  related  lo
the level of reservesb.
As one  mav expect.  if reserves  increase  default  transfers  and  this  effect  is strong
enough,  investment  in  debt  buybacks  emerges agairn as  a  possibly  attractive  asset.  Le:
default proceeds be now A(y, s), with A, >  0.  Solving for the  optimai  post-default  path
under  this  set-up  will  yield  the  optimal  sequence  of reserve  holdings  s,  which  in  turn
determines  the  equilibrium  value  of  the  secondary  market  price.  Going  back  to  the
necessary conditions for optimality,  equation  (11) now becomes
(12)  E  [11C)  (c  -A 2)I  YP]  = E [ul(c') I'1  ['  - ((y*I)1  p-p(b:)
Now some of the returns  from reserves are taxed  awav  in default  states.  So the  beneficial
insurance  effects  of reserves  are  watered  down,  while their  overall  expected  return  falls
below the risk-free  interest  rate.  For a sufficiently large A 2, the countrv  may benefit from
buybacks  at  the fair  price,  if a  favorable  realization  of y  occurs:  The  country  wants  to
transfer  consumption  to  the  next  peried.  but  this  is possible only to  the extent  that  asset
acumulation  does not result  in an increase of payment  to creditors.  In repayment  states,
payments  are  limited  by  the  size of the  obligation,  so both  a  debt  buvback  and  reserve
accumulation  are  effective  in  transferring  consumption  to  those  states.  Transferring
consumption  to  default  states  is  more  problematic.  because  payments  are  determined
8In  this case, the first  best policv would be for international  institutions  not  to make aid a
function of the level of reserves.  A precommitment  problem obviously arises here.t it  tlfiri  it  t!  L,iriI  r  e_IIor111  r(  att(  ()rs  ti  Iikte1%  to dtct1 ( I)iu  II hut  s(,u  t,  l  I  t,  < III  tIt,  (  t it  .sset  S.
'  a..ti .*t  '  '1 1 ,:  .*  1:;;  !.'t;,AtsX  ri...  exr  "  X,t  >.r,ger  :r.1:esf 1 s  if  1 .e  'ul;~ rs
III  oIWP,  '11  d  Pu 'el  ll('s  w*iIjd  save  niiore and ihvy  woUl(r ust  reser  '  e  i  investmHent  iII
,;I(  el'.  dji(d.  :  1.l  l./;  t lltai  L,uyt,a.  ks.  Su,  li ap  irr.MnIni! :,'  v,u 'Idi  I require  miidki  Iig (I  t,
expli( itlv  state-ontingent.
Note  ha!  itf  L,t,  l  ;nr  lias  a  u,_`  u  t  funt,ttion  '  ,usa  Aks a-  tli te  . prict
aiwavs  dominate  reserves.  as  lonig as  A, >  0.  With  risk-aversion.  on  the  other  hand.  the
size  4f  A 2 matteH,,  aild  it  is therefore  crucial  to  evaluate  empirically  the  degree  by  which
reserves  are  taxec  awav  hv  creditors.  tUnfortuinatelv.  the  two  ernpirical  studies  mentioned
above  suggest  very  different  sizes  for  A 2. '  z>r  and  Huizinga  obtain  an  extremely  smal'
coetficient.  while  Acharva  and  Diwan  a verv  large  one.  Assuming  that  A is homogeneous  of
degree  one  in  reserves,  with  a debt to  (GNP ratio of 0. 72, an  interest  rate  of S% and  a  7,G0%
seconuiarv market discount.  Acharva and  DiwarTis  resgilt  imr,-]  ,  Y  value  of Al over
defaul'. states  (of  0.74.  This  means -hat  if  he probalbility of default  is less than  74 'c.  A, is
on average greater  than  one.  On the other  hand.  this  parameter  would be close to zero if
'Ozler and Huizinga's  values are correct.  Obviously, more empirical work is needed to sclve
the  issue.
4.  Investment in Physical Capital.
The  main  difference  between  investing  in  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  in  the
production  f output  (aside fromn  differences in expected  rates of return)  is that  the latte
vields random  returns.  For a  risk-averse  countrv.  the  attractiveness  of investment  will
'hen  generally  depend  on  the  covariance  between  the  marginal  product  of  capital  andmarginal utilitv.  This  section examines the  case in which investment  is in the  production
of more of the  only good in  the economy  (output),  and  its  marginal  product  is positively
correiated  with  current  consumDtion.  This  would be the  case of an  HIC investing  in  the
production  of  her  export  staple,  for  instance.  Since the  country  is generally unable  to
obtair.  insurance  against  aggregate  shocks.  this  type  of  investment  has  undesirable
properties  from the  point of view of consumption  smoothing.  Hence, even if the expected
marginal  product of capital  is above the risk-free  rate  and  returns  from investment  do not
Increase default transfers,  a buyback at the fair price can be welfare improving.
Suppose that  output  v is now produced  bv means of capital,  and  let w f(k)  be the
production function. w is the  realization of an  i.i.d. productivity  shock W that  takes values
in some set  W.  G! ) and g(  are now the c.d.f. and  p.d.f. of the productivity  shock.  For
future reference, define wy  to be the unconditional  mean of W,  wr =  E  IW  I  W]  the mean
conditional on repayment  in the next  period. and  w  =  E jW  j  WA]  the mean conditional
on default  in the next period.  Let q be the rate  or depreciation  of the capital  stock,  and  it
oe new investment.  The v-,iue function  under default  is now
vd(k.  w) =  max ufw f(k) -i  - A(w. k)l +  SE  fVd(kl.  w')1
s.to  k' = k (1-q)o  i
(now the  loss in  case  of default  is a  function  of the  capital  stock  as  well).  The  value
function in case of repayment  is20
Vr(k. b. w) = max u(cr) +  6E  max [Vr(k', b',  w'), Vd(k',  w')I
s.to  kI=k(1-q)+i.b'<b
wherec  =wf(k)-i-dd+b)+p(b)b.Letfl(k)-=  f  d  ,andsupposeq=Ofor r  ak
simDlicitv.  Also. take  the  case less favorable  to  buvbacks.  in which increased investment
does not affect the ioss in case of default.  By combining first  order and envelope conditions
as in the previous sections. and  if the credit ceiling does not bind. one gets
p(b) u'(cr)  =  W5f  ,  u'(cr)  g(W) dW
r
u (cr  =  w  f w'  [W  fl(k)  + 1]  u'(c')  g(W) dW + f  W'  [w ft(k') + 1] u'(cA)  g(W) dW r  rdI
Let cov  r[w, u (c.)]  denote  the covariance between productivity  and  the marginal  utility  of
consumption  conditional  on repayment.  and  analogously  for covw,  u'(cA)].  Under  the
assumptions,  these  covariances  are  negative,  since  w  is  positively  correlated  with
consumption. and marginal utilitv  is a decreasing function of c.  Let w*' denote the default
level of the shock.  Combining the two equations above and using the definitions
ri  _G(  w*  'l  r1 - p  [g  Nf'(k  ' )+11  { 3%  -UI  V'j  - - r. 
(13)  E[u'L(c  W'|] =  E[u'(c  )I  W$]  ,  l  I  r  I  '
6  G(w*')  - l  P  [wdf'(kl)±11
where21
K =-{[1  - G( Wv)] covr(W.  u'(c')]  + G( Wj)  covdfw.u'(cd)]}{G(w*')[w  dI(k )+11i`  > 0
Except  for the term  K. equation  (13)  is just  a modif;ed version  of (11).  the corresDonding
optimal insurance  condition under reserve accumulation.  After some manipulations it  ca.
be shown that  if p is the fair price, and  if the expected marginal product  of caDital *  f'(k'l
=  ;  The product of the two terms in brackets on the RHS of (13) is equal to I.  So if K  =
O  expected  conditional  marginal  utilities  would  be  equalized.  But  if  w  is  positivelv
correLated with  consumption,  K  >  0 and  when buybacks  and  investment  yield  the  same
rate  of return  the  countrv  wants  to  skew consumption  towards  repayment  states.  For  K
sufficiently large, this  may require debt buybacks.
As in the case cf reserves. it is likelv that  in default  states  some of the returns  from
new  investment  are  captured  by  the  creditors,  which  in  turn  makes  transferring
consumption  to default  states even costlier.
5.  Negotiated Debt  Buybacks.
The  lack  of  an  enforceable  senioritv  structure  in  international  sovereign  lending
makes  it  impossible  for a  country  to  repurchase  her  debt  at  a  price  corresponding to  an
expected  return  equal  to the  risk-free  rate.  even if lenders are  risk-neutral.  Lenders are
willing to  sell their  loans  only if they  can get more than  their  opportunity  cost of funds.
These observations  suggest that  there  is a case for subsidizing debt  buvbacks  (and  taxing
new  borrowing),  or  for  promoting  concerted  agreements  that  make  buybacks  rnore
attractive  to  debtors.  In  practice.  most  large  debt  buvbacks  have taken  place  within  a22
broader concerted agreement, if  nothing else because lenders must unanimouslv waive
sharing clauses for buybacks to go through [see K. Froot (1989)]. S.nce buybacks at  the
market  price make creditors strictlv  better  off as a  group. if countries bargain over  a
buyback  deal  thty  should  be  able  to  extract  some  additional  concessions, ever  if
international institutions do not intervene in the process.
The simplest  way to  remove the distortion  in the  buyback price would be to  try to
force creditors to sell at the fair price.  Obviously. however. each individuai lender has an
incentive to free-ride on such an agreement, since they make a capital gain if they hold orn
to their claims. Fortunatelv, it is possible to design slightly more complicated  agreements
such that  each lender is indifferent betweer  ce7  :..  ;..  zu. se;';  A.g,  a:.  suc.. t.hat the jrice
is the fair price.  Two examples of such schemes are discussed here.  The first one is a
permission  to buyback debt accompanied  by a reduction in the interest rate on outstanding
obiigations.  For an appropriate choice of interest rate reduction, the countrv can end up
purchasing  the debt at exactly the fair price, while no lender has an incentive  to free-ride.
Let B be the amount of debt that the country wants to retire and g be the interest
rate carried by debt maturing in  the next period.  The fair price for the buyback is then
(all the rest of the notation is like in section 2)
p=  f1 -G(y*I)1(1+g)
If the countrv offers to repurchase at this price, and no interest rate reduction is grantea.
no lender would sell.  The price at which lenders are willing to sell, if the interest rate on
the outstanding debt is reduced bv k is23
p* =  G(y*')] (1 + g -k)  + 8 wyv*')(D  - B)-1
If no lender shouid profit from free -riding it must be p =  p*. hence
k=  y*!  {fl-G(y*')]  (D  -BWi
The value of  is iess than r if
g fi-G(y*')] (D - B) >  ,y* )
Hence. if expected future  interest pavments exceed expected default  Droceeds.  for anv
amount of debt that the country wishes  to retire, there is a level of interest rate reduction
such that  the creditors are willing to sell at  the fair price.  After the deal. creditors are
exactly as well off as they were before. If the country can credibly threaten not to buyback
any debt unless enough interest rate reduction is granted. she can extract all the surDlus
and pay exactly the fair price.  A more realistic bargaining outcome will leave some gains
to the creditors. and the price at which the concerted buvback occurs would  be somewhere
between p and p*.  This means that the distortion is not compleiely  removed. In this case
there is an efficiencv  argument to subsidize  debt buybacks. and the funds committed bv
international institutions to this purpose are not a pure transfer to  the parties involved,
but generate welfare  gains.
An agreement of the type just described resembles  the Chilean buyback of 1988. In
that vear Chile had an unusuallv large trade surplus thanks to favorable copper prices, and
creditors agreed to allow the country to use US$  50C  million  of reserves  for debt buybacks24
either  on  the  secondarv  market  or in  private  negotiations  to  be carried  out  in the  next
thre?  years.  In the same year,  Chile obtained  that  the spread paid on outstanding  loans be
reauced  to  13/16  percent.  In  November.  $299 million  of debt  was retired  at  an  average
d.scount  of 44 cents on the dollar,  which was the  secondary market  discount  [World Debt
Tables ( 1988-9)].  This episode seem to  correspond  well to  the concerted  agreement  just
described.
in  the second tvpe of concerted buvback a 'new  monev" reouirement  iS imDosed on
banks that  do not sei, their  debt at the buyback  price.  This  scheme is discussed by Diwan
and  Kietzer  (1990)  in reference to  the  Mexican  debt  reduction  agreement  of 1989.  This
agreement  was Tiot  a  buyback, but  a  swap of debt  for exit  bonds.  Since the exit  bonds (a
discount  bond  or  a  par  bond  with  a  lower interest  rate)  implied  lower  expected  debt
service. debt  reduction was achieved.  'o  induce banks to agree to the swap, the exit  bonds
were enhanced in various wavs through  coliateral  and partiai  guarantees.  So the operation
was similar to a  buyback, in which the value of the  enhancements  corresponds  to the  cash
spent  for direct  reDurchases.  Banks  were required  to  commit  new funds in  proportion  of
the exposure that  was not swapped.  This requiremernt . just  a way to  force creditors  who
do  not  exit  to  finance  part  of the  buvback.  Let  x  be  the  amount  of new monev  (as  a
fraction of exposure) that  lenders who do not sell their  claims must extend.  Notice that  to
achieve the desired level of debt  reduction  now the countrv  has to retire  more debt. since
the new monev increases total  indebtedness.  In particular,  B + x (D - B)  will have to be
repurchased.  Tne price at  which ienders are willing to sell. given that  thev have to relend
a fraction x of residual exposure is
13  =  - G(y*_') (i  + g) +  -3,  +  /y*  ,} (  + x) -x25
For every un:t  or debt not  sold a creditor  must  invest x of new money which will yield an
expected repavment  equal to  the expression in brackets.  Th-  vaiue of x such that  D  =-
is
x =  i  3-  B  dxv')
L(D -B)  J
where  d  =  1  3- [1 - G(v*)l  (1  +  g)  +  (D  - B)  S  :avy*I)  is  the  discount  at  which  the
debt  wouid be soid after the buyback, in the absence oi a new money requirement.  Such a
requirement  is a transfer  to the debtor  because lenders are forced to issue at par  loans that
are traded  at  iess than  face vaiue.  Another  way of interpreting  the formula above is tnat
what lenders gain on each unit  of buvback  (3  fi,y*') (D  - B)-'  must  be exactiv  equal tc
what they lose (d x).
A debt buyback accompanied  by a new money requirement  has recentlv been carried
out by the Philippines.  US$  1.3 billion of debt was retired  at a 50% discount.  At the same
time.  US S 714 million in new monev was extended.  so that  the  buvback  was more than
fully financed  by the creditors.  Banks could still  have been better  off. if the market  value
of debt after the  deal had increased  sufficientl.  In practice.  the  market  value of debt  fell
from US $ 5.19 billion to  US S 4.96 billion,  and banks  lost from the Philippine  Duvback 9.
When countries  can strike  such  good deals  (or  when creditors  are so generous),  it  is not
hard  to  buybacks  can  increase  their  weifare  aside  from  intertemporal  consumption
smoothing considerations.
91t is possible to show that  buvbacks  financed by creditors  make the creditors  better  off if
and  oniv  if  the  couuntrv  is  on  tne  wrong side  of tne  aebt-Laffer  curve.  that  is  if the
elasticitv  of the secondarv market  price to the face value of debt is greater  than  one26
Finailv.  attempts  to repurchase debt at above the market  price. such as the Mexican
swap in 1988 [see R.  Lambdany  (988)',  and  Chile's  second buyback  in  1989, resulted  in
verv iittle  debt being tendered.  showing tnat  more complex deals are necessarv to deal with
f.ee-riding.
5.  More on ;he Lei,e.  ':  vhe Market.
Aside  from  the  lack of  seniority,  other  elemen.s  may  put  a  wedge  between  the
secondary market  price of debt and the fair price.  One of these elements is the  presence of
'mispriced)  Federal Deposit  Insurance (FDI)  in the United  States.  Since deposits  are fully
insured.  and  insurance  Dremia do  not  depend  on  the  riskiness  of a  bank's  Dortfolio. the
secondary market  price  is equal to  expected payments  conditional  on  the  bank  not  going
bankrUDt in the next  period:  Repavments  occurring in bankruptcy  states  go to  depositors.
as part of the bankruptcy  proceeds.  If the deposit were not  insured,  these payments  would
lower the  interest  rate  on deposits.  With  insurance.  thev  simpiv accrue  to  the  FDI.  and
since insurance  premia  are  fiat  they  do  not  affect  banks'  profits.  If  the  probability  of
bankruDtcV is not  zero. the conditional  exDectation is smaller  than  the unconditional  one.
and  the  secondary  market  value  of  debt  is  lower  than  the  present  value  of  expected
repavments.  This distortion  tends to offset the distortion  due to lack of senioritv.
S.  Ozler  and  H. Huizinga  (1990)  raise  the  issue  of the  effects  of federal  deposit
insurance on secondarv market  prices.  Thev find that  the debt of countries  to which banks
are  more exposed  trades  at  a  higher  price.  This  is explained  through  a model  in which,
because oi  FDI.  banks do  not  care  about  expected  repayments  in  bankruptcv  states:  If
banks  are  very  exposed  to  country  A and  country  A  repays,  the  bamnk  is unlikely  to  go2t
bankruDt.  Converseiv.  repavment  bv  a  small  debtor  do  not  affect  the  DrobabHlitv of
bankruptcy.  Since it  is the  returns  in those  bankruptcy  states  in  which countries  repay
that  are missing from  banks  valuation.  ceteris  Daribus banks value  more debt  of countries
to which thev  are highly exposed.  Consistent  with the FD'I  hypothesis, Ozler and Huizinga
also find that  strengtnening  capitai  requirements  would increase the market  price of debt.
u.Qously.  however,  !hey  conclude  that  their  findings  "strengthen  the  arguments  that
buvbacks  mav  be harmful  to  countries;.  In  fact.  debt  buvbacks  ailow countries  to  take
advantage of the presence of subsidized F':.
In a  recent  paper.  A. Demirguc-Kunt  and  I. Diwan (1990) study  the consequences
o3  book-value  regulations  on banks behavior.  Loans that  are valued at  a discount  on  the
secondarv market  can  be carried  on the books at  face value,  according to  U.S. regulatorv
practices.  If some of the debt  is sold, however, the entire  portfolio must  be written  down.
Since a  iarger book value of asset  allows to  increase ieverage. which  in turn  increases the
implicit  subsidy  from  the  FDIC,  selling  debt  at  a  discount  generates  an  extra-cost  to
commerciai banks.  This  effect tends  to  bias secondary  market  prices upward.  A study  of
the  1989  Brazilian  rescheduling  confirms  that  banks'  financial  strength  is  positively
correlated with their  willingness to exit at a discount.
Another  aspect  of banks'  environment  that  potentially  distorts  secondary  market
prices is the asvmmetrv  of the tax svstem.  In the U.S.. the  tax svstem is not  neutral  with
respect to the time  pattern  of profits and  losses reported  by corporations:  Losses generate
tax-credits  that  can be carried  back UD  to tnree  vears into the  Dast  (meaning  that  banks
ca. obtain  a  refund of  taxes  paid in  the  previous  three  years  up  to  the  amount  of the
credit).  If the  tax-credit  exceeds taxes  paid. in  the  previous three  vears.  losses can  be
carried forward for fifteen years, but  no interest  accrues on them.  This amounts  to lending26
to the government  at  zero interest  rate.  After a few vears of low profitabilitv,  the tax cost
of posting  losses can be very significant, and  banks have an incentive  to keep assets such as
HIC loans  at face value  in their  books until  a  period of profitability  occurs.  Banks  who
have not  recently  beer, and  are not  very profitable  would demand a higher price for selling
their  loans on  the  secondary  market.  Hence. the  asvmmetry  in  the  tax  system  tends  to
bias secondary  market  prices upwards.  The size of the bias is going to be more significant
in Deriods in which commercial banks are not verv profitable and interest  rates are high.
6&  Conclusions.
Whether  a rational  and ortimizing  government  would ever repurchase  debt on the
secordary  market  if it could do so at a fair price is a rather  complex issue.  Debt buybacks
are best  viewed as the  purchase of an  asset.  In the  context  of intertemporal  consumption
smoothing,  countries  are more likely to benefilt from such a purchase when they  experience
unusuailv favorable  levels of income (or  foreign exchange earnings).  The attractiveness  of
debt buybacks  also depends on whether  they pay larger expected rates of return  than  other
assets.  and  on  how the  returns  are  distributed  across  states  of  nature.  Debt  buvbacks
should yield an expected return  equal to  the risk-free  interest  rate,  if the distortion  due to
the  lack  of senioritv  rights  in  sovereign  lending  was  removed.  Returns,  however.  are
concentrated  exclusively in non-default  states,  which tend  to be high consumption states.
So debt  buvbacks  appear  to  be  a  rather  unattractive  asset  from  the  point  of  view  of
:nsurance.  Nonetheless,  highly  ndebted  countries  may not  have much better  alternatives
to carrv  consumption  into  the  future:  Accumulation  of foreign exchange  reserves  could
provide an expected rate  of return equal to the risk-free  rate in all states  of nature,  but for29
a number  of reasons (that  need more careful theoreticai  and  empirical  investigation)  it  is
likely to increase  payments  to creditors  in default  states.  Large reserves are also likely to
reduce the amount  of concessional lending that  the countrv can receive.  When these effects
are taken into account,  reserves yield less than the risk-free  rate  in expected value, and the
returns  are skewed towards high income states.
As to  investment  in physical capital,  if projects that  yield large rates of return  tend
to  be positiveiv correiateG witn output  also this  aiternative  is not  verv attractive  from an
insurance  point  of  view.  Moreover,  investment  does not  provide  an  "efficient"  way  or
transferring consumption  to  default  states  if  the  returns  are  partiaiiy  appropriated  bv
creditors.  On  the  other  hand,  i'  the  country  has  investment  projects  that  tend  to  be
negativelv  correlated  with  outDut and  yieid a rate  of return  not  too far from the risk-4ree
rate,  these projects should be preferred to debt repurchases.
From this perspective, attempts  at eliminating  the bias against  buvbacks due to the
absence of seniority  should yield welfare improvements,  at  least under some circumstances.
Buvbacks  that  are  accompanied  bv  an  appropriate  reduction  of  the  spread  at  which
outstanding  debt  is rescheduled  or by  new money requirements  can reduce the distortion,
while requiring  a minimum amount  of coordination among banks.  Both  schemes have been
u';ilized  successfully.  0$  course,  if  it  was  possible  to  create  an  enforceable  seniority
structure  in sovereign lending. the distortion  would be directlv eliminated.
Finally,  the rate  of return  on buybacks is also likely to depend on the  characteristics
of  the  creditors.  There  are  indication  that  the  presence  of (MisDriced) federal  deposit
.nsurance  tends  to  distort  downwards  the  secondary  market  price  of  debt,  thereby
increasing  the rate  of return  on buvbacks.  On the other  hand. the requirement  that  forcesoU
banks to  write down to  market  value the  entire  portfolio  of debt.  if some of it is sold at  a
discount, tends to  have the opposite effect.  Also, the asymmetry  of the tax system  is likely
to  bias  uowards  secondarv  market  prices.  in  periods  of  low  bank  profitabilitv.  These
considerations  suggest that  more sophisticated  modelling of the lenders' side of the market
is needed to interpret  observed secondarv market  Dr:--s correctlv.31
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